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ABSTRACT 
Determinants of Residential Water Conservation: The Case of Salt Lake City, Utah 
by 
Eric A. Coleman, Master of Science 
Utah State University, 2004 
Major Professor: Dr. Terrence F. Glover 
Department: Economics 
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This study evaluates the effectiveness of demand-side water conservation policies 
in Salt Lake City, Utah for the years 1999 to 2002. We add to the existing residential 
water demand literature by exploring panel estimation techniques with di saggregated 
household level data. Alternative policies used to induce water conservation are 
di scussed based on estimates of demand schedule parameters . We find that public 
conservation .campaigns have had negli gible impacts on the city's water use. There have 
been, however, statistically significant reductions in consumption due to price changes 
despite minimal price increases. Our findings should enable local and state policymakers 
to better assess the tradeoffs of alternative conservation programs. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
The Utah Wasatch Front region has experienced periodic drought throughout its 
history, and in every year since 1999 Utah 's annual rainfall has been below its thirty-year 
average (UDWR 2002). These conditions, combined with rapid population growth, have 
made water allocation an important policy debate in the region (UDWR 2003). 
Traditionally, the state has addressed these needs with attempts at increasing water 
suppl ies and improving infrastructure for delivery. Federal projects such as the Weber 
Basin, Central Valley and Joes Va lley, and local projects subsidized by state agencies, 
made continued exploration possible (UDWR 2002). 
Recently, the municipal government of Salt Lake City has recogni zed the limits of 
water exploration and the impending need for increased conservation. The city started 
experimenting with demand-side management policies in 1995 by commissioning a panel 
to assess potential conservation from rate structure changes in its billing. In the city' s 
2002 Summer Water Management Plan, there is mention of the need for a "more 
aggressive water rate structure," and eventual change for pricing in the summer of2003 
(SLC DPU 2002). However, residential and agricultural users have been particularly 
hostile to those changes. 
Alternative (non-price) demand-side management policies have been introduced 
in many areas where price increases seem politically infeasible. In particular, Salt Lake 
Ci ty has implemented moral suasion programs to encourage conservation as part of the 
statewide public education water conservation campaign known as "Slow the flow, Save 
H20" (SLC DPU 2002; UDWR 2002). This campaign includes mailings, television and 
radio ads, and a webpage. The Utah Division of Water Resources (2002) asserts that 
water use has decreased " . . in every water district studied, a probable result of the 
campaign." In addition, water efficiency studies have been conducted for municipal 
green spaces and the public information campaign has been augmented with 
"demonstration gardens" within the city. Myriad other projects have also emerged, 
including those for specific conservation targets involving large water users and 
participation in the EPA Water Alliance for Voluntary Efficiency (WAVE) program 
(SLC DPU 2002). 
Burgeoning debate in Utah around inducing residential water conservation makes 
this study especially salient to policymakers at the state and municipal level. Many Utah 
cities have experimented recently with changing water rate structures, and many more 
participate in the "Slow the Flow" information campaign. Because issues of water 
shortage and rate increases now face citizens statewide, there has been immense public 
interest and much media attention to the issue. Salt Lake City is the state 's largest city, 
as well as one of its fastest growing cities, and is therefore especially important in the 
policy debate. 
This debate suggests that more information is needed on the forces that induce 
water conservation. The purpose of this current study is to attempt to analyze the effects 
of pricing strategies relative to moral suasion campaigns on water use within the Salt 
Lake City area. A water use equation is estimated to identify the separate impacts of these 
forces. Results from this paper add to information available to policymakers statewide 
when deciding on conservation strategies. 
We independently assess the magnitude of the state public information 
campaign's effectiveness on Salt Lake City's water use patterns. Alternative water 
conservation strategies are then offered based on price elasticities measured from a 
sample of residential water users. The wealth of household-specific time series data 
provide a unique opportunity to model use responsiveness of individual households to 
these various policy alternatives. 
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To our know ledge, this is the first water use study using panel data methods to 
obtain estimates at the household level. In short, we find that increasing prices would be 
significantly effective at reducing water consumption in summer months when most 
discretionary water use takes place. In addition, there have been only negligible effects 
on the city's water use from the statewide "Slow the Flow" public information campaign. 
The next section reviews the literature in residential water demand. Section three 
introduces the data and section four reviews the econometric models used to arrive at our 
results. Section four reports empirical findings and section five concludes. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Howe and Linaweaver (1967) conducted one of the first aggregate studies of 
residential water demand by comparing a cross-section of cities throughout the United 
States. Using a simple linear regression model, they found indoor water demand to be 
relatively price inelastic. The authors also concluded that consumers react to average 
prices instead of marginal prices, because few consumers know how to read water meters 
accurately. Therefore, consumers are unaware of their water use vis-a-vis block rate 
structures that induce differing marginal prices depending on consumption level. 
Following this study, others in early water demand literature also used "ex post 
calculated" average prices (Nieswiadomy and Molina 1989). Three problems arose with 
this early approach. First, conventional microeconomic theory posits agents making 
decisions based on marginal rather than average prices. Second, prices are likely 
correlated with the stochastic disturbance term in the single equation water demand 
model, and are therefore endogenous. Third, aggregate cross sectional data is limited in 
its ability to model individual consumer behavior. Water economists subsequently tried 
compensating for each of these shortcomings. Each is addressed below. 
Price Definition 
Borrowing from concurrent research in utility markets, where similar block-rate 
pricing exists, the specification of price variables has changed. In his study of the 
electricity sector Taylor (1975) argued that marginal and average price should be used 
together for estimates in markets under block pricing. Nordin (1976) later modified 
Taylor's suggestion by requiring a "difference" variable instead of average price. The 
Taylor-Nordin difference variable, or rate premium, is defined as the difference between 
what consumers would pay had they been charged their ending marginal price all along, 
and what they actually have to pay. The difference variable takes into account that 
residential water users face intrarnarginal differences in price depending on their 
consumption level. Because of inconsistent marginal prices under block-rate pricing, 
consumer income deviates from what it would be if water were sold under constant 
marginal prices (Dandy, Nguyen, and Davies 1997). 
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A simple example of Salt Lake City's billing structure helps to illustrate. The 
city's tariff system uses a fixed allowance and a constant block rate as shown in Figure 1, 
where average price is measured against water use. Up to the first W 1 (500 cubic feet) 
units of water, consumers are charged a flat fee R 1 x W 1• Note that a household 
consuming beyond the first block at, say, W2 is being charged marginal rate R2 for all 
water in excess ofW 1• The marginal price facing this consumer is R2, so that the average 
price per hundred cubic feet of water is falling. In a competitive market this consumer's 
total expenditure for water would be the shaded portion of the graph (area R2 x W 2). 
w 
W 1=500 W2 
FIGURE I 
lLLUSTRA TION OF TH E TA YLOR-NORDIN DIFFERENCE V ARJABLE 
Due to the block-rate structure, however, the actual bill is the shaded area plus the 
crosshatched area (R1 - R2 x W1) in the above region. If the household had been charged 
the marginal price of water for the entire bill, their bill would be lower. The crosshatched 
area acts as an implicit use tax, and is therefore expected to be negatively related to water 
use. It represents the so-called Taylor-Nordin difference. Note that an increasing block 
rate structure implies an implicit income subsidy (Renwick and Green 2000), and the 
effect of income on water consumption should be equal in magnitude and opposite in sign 
of the difference variable (Nieswiadomy 1992). 
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The water demand literature has generally incorporated the Taylor-Nordin 
specification for price variab les, but some studies have tried to empirically test whether 
consumers react to marginal or average prices. Nieswiadomy (1992) used a "perceived 
price," which is simply a combination of average and marginal prices first developed by 
Shin (1985). Opaluch (1982) suggests using a new price variable, defined as the 
difference between average and marginal prices, and develops a limited test for inference 
of the appropriate variable. This specification was later used by Nauges and Thomas 
(2000). 
Water is typically assumed to be price inelastic, at least at low quantities of 
consumption, but market demand curves for most functional forms are elastic in some 
regions and inelastic in others. Therefore, any statement of price elasticity of water must 
be qualified within a given price range. Disparate results emerge from the plethora of 
water demand studies; however, based on a meta-analysis of forty-five studies that derive 
price elasticity measures, Dalhuisen et al. (2003) concluded that residential water demand 
is generally relatively price inelastic. Factors influencing that finding are functional form 
of models, accuracy of information of block pricing, and inclusion of alternative price 
specifications. Interestingly, the discrete-continuous choice model first used by Hewitt 
and Hanemann ( 1995) consistently provides inelastic price estimates. 
Brookshire et al. (2002) review a number of water demand studies focused 
specifically on the western U.S., and question the validity of many elasticity measures. 
They maintain that in communities where cost-based marginal prices are "far" from the 
rates actually being charged, elasticity estimates may not be useful to policymakers, 
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especially since this jeopardizes the applicability of such measures to price ranges outside 
of the actual prices being studied. 
Model Specification 
The literature has generally led to the conclusion that under block rate pricing 
there is bias in ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of single equation water demand 
models, because of the joint determination of water use and prices (Nieswiadomy and 
Molina 1989; Hewitt and Hanemann 1995; Renzetti 2002). Water users respond to the 
marginal price of water by consuming a given amount. The amount they consume also 
determines the price of water if they face a block rate. The Taylor-Nordin difference 
variable is also determined by consumption and must be solved simultaneously with the 
other two variables. As mentioned by Hewitt and Hanemann (1995), water demand 
models often compensate for this endogeneity by using instrumental variables under two-
or three-stage least squares estimation techniques. 
Dalhuisen et al. (2003) summarize common variables used in identifying 
residential water demand. Economic variables, such as price (marginal, average, and the 
difference variable) and income are commonly included, and are usually the primary 
focus of all research. These measures are vital in explaining how water markets work, 
and nearly every study on water demand reports one or both. 
Climatic variables are also commonly included. These variab les are assumed to 
be exogenous and are often statistically significant. For example, seasonality affects 
sprinkler use and lawn watering differences throughout the year. Soil type, 
evapotranspiration, rainfall, and elevation may all contribute to changes in water use 
(Hansen, Hughes, and Chiang 1994). Household variables commonly used include 
income, income proxies, commercial/residential dummies, lot size, number of bathrooms, 
and household density. All of these explanatory variables may be significant in defining 
water demand. 
A number of studies have also used alternative demand-side management policies 
such as public information campaigns and conservation programs as explanatory 
variables affecting water use (Michelsen, McGuckin, and Stumpf 1999; Nieswiadomy 
1992; Renwick and Archibald 1998; Renwick and Green 2000). For example, Renwick 
and Archibald (1998) look at the effects of the 1982-92 California droughts on 119 
households in the communities of Goleta and Santa Barbara. The cities tried several 
alternative demand-side management policies to curtail water use during and after the 
drought. For instance, Santa Barbara restricted irrigation use and Goleta allocated water 
quotas based on historic use and imposed stringent fee increases for quota violations. 
Subsidies for low-flow toilets and showerheads, retrofitting, and public information 
campaigns to inform citizens on water efficient irrigation technologies were also used in 
the region. The authors conclude that each policy alternative had a statistically 
significant effect on reduced water demand in the area. 
Two years later, Renwick and Green (2000) extended the study to eight 
aggregated California water districts. Their goal was to assess the relative effectiveness 
of alternative policies in reducing water demand. They found that price responsiveness 
varied seasonally, and that stringent mandatory non-price policies, such as quotas, were 
more effective in reducing use than voluntary measures, such as rebates, retrofitting, and 
public information campaigns. The authors conclude that modest decreases in water use 
(5%-15%) can be achieved through price mechanisms or voluntary measures, but that 
significant reduction (> 15%) is best achieved through well -enforced rationing schemes. 
Table I gives results from studies using public infonnation campaigns as explanatory 
variables. It shows that moral suasion campaigns may be very effective at reducing 
demand. However, these studies fail to analyze the long-term effects of campaigns and 
the costs of implementation. 
TABLE 1 
STUDIES OF PUBLIC INFORMATION CAMPAIGN EFFECTIVENESS 
Study 
Michelsen, McGuckin and Stumpf(l999) 
Nieswiadomy (1992) 
Location 
Los Angeles 
San Diego 
Denver 
Broomfield 
Albuquerque 
Santa Fe 
Las Cruces 
North Central U.S. 
Northeast U.S. 
Southern U.S. 
Western U.S. 
Renwick and Green (2000) 8 California cities 
*significant at 5%; **significant at I% 
Data 
Effect on Mean 
Consumption (%)' 
-I. I** 
-2.7** 
-2.0** 
0.0 
-2 .0** 
-4.0** 
0.0 
1.9 
-4.24 
17.6 
-17.56* 
-8.0** 
Danielson (1979) argues that using cross sectional data for demand analysis 
requires the heroic assumption that the spatial effect of the explanatory variables equals 
the temporal effect. Hanke (1970), Danielson (1979), Hewitt and Hanemann (1995), and 
1 Effects from Michelsen, McGuckin, and Stumpf( 1999) and Renwick and Green (2002) are taken from 
the respective study. To e stimate the mean effect on consumption for Nieswiadomy ( 1992) we used 
Kennedy 's ( 1981) teclmique: 
%Effect = 100( exp(fJ - v;)) -1) 
where f3 is the dummy variable regression coefficient for the public information campaign, and V({J) is 
the variance of j3 . 
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Brookshire eta!. (2002) instead argue that data should ideally be collected from a number 
of households over time in order to accurately measure consumer behavior. 
Unfortunatel y, such data are difficult to obtai n. Many studies still use aggregated cross 
sectional data across states, communities, or regions because it is readily available 
(Gaudin, Griffin, and Sickles 2001; Howe and Linaweaver 1967; Michelsen, McGuckin, 
and Stumpf 1999; Nieswiadomy 1992; Renwick and Archibald 1998; Renwick and Green 
2000). 
To exploi t the properties of combined cross sectional time seri es data (also known 
as panel data), a number of estimation techniques have been developed. However, only a 
few water demand studies have incorporated panel estimation. Although Gaudin et a!. 
(200 I), Renwick and Green (2000), and Nauges and Thomas (2000) use such models for 
residential water demand, they are limited by the use of aggregate data obtained at the 
community level. Moeltner and Stoddard (2004) obtain panel estimates from a random 
effects model at the firm level for commercial water use, but to our knowledge panel data 
models for residential households have not been thoroughly explored. 
Brookshire et a!. (2002) argue that disaggregate household data need to be 
combined with adequate fluctuations in price to accurately estimate a price elasticity 
measure. Communities, however, do not dramatically change water prices over short 
periods of time, making price elasticities immeasurable. Gathering household data over 
lengthy time periods is also costly and time consuming. 
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III. DATA 
A complete database of Salt Lake Ci ty households ' monthly water use during the 
period from February 1999 to October 2002 was obtained from the Utah Division of 
Water Resources. Water use from the billing period is converted to daily averages and 
then transformed to thirty-day averages in order to have conformable data between cross 
sections. Quantity is reported in thirty-day averages of hundred cubic feet (HCF) 
consumed. Marginal prices and the Taylor-Nordin difference variable were calculated 
based upon the city-mandated price structure. They are adjusted for inflation (CPT base 
year 2002) in price per hundred cubic feet of water. Although rates slightly increased 
nominally from year to year over the study period (see Table 2), real winter rates 
remained relatively constant, and in some years even decreased. Yearly summer rates 
had slightly more price variation from year to year. 
The city 's billing structure is complex. The first determinant of the bill is the 
connection size of the pipe for incoming water. Based upon that size, the city charges a 
flat fee for the first 500 cubic feet of water consumed, and a lower average fee for each 
I 00 cubic feel of water thereafter. Dwellings outside of city boundari es that are serviced 
by Salt Lake City are charged an even hi gher marginal rate if consumption is beyond the 
fi xed allowance. In this study, the total water bill is inferred from total usage, connection 
size, location, and pricing determined by city ordinance. In instances where the billing 
period is not thirty days the city extends the fl at-fee allowable amount in proportion to 
the lag in measuring time. For example, a user with a one inch connection that is billed 
45 days after the previous billing would be charged the "one inch flat fee" for the first 
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( 45) . . . . 500 x 
30 
= 750 cub1c feet of water consumed and the appropnate margmal pnce for 
any water consumed in excess of that amount. Knowing the dates o f the readings has 
allowed us to reconstruct the bill for each household despite the inconsistency in 
measurement with respect to time. 
TABLE2 
WATER BILLING WITHIN SALT L AKE CITY 
Dates Meter Size Fixed Fee Season Nominal Marginal Rate 
3/4" & I" $6.3 1 
I 112" $18.38 W inter 0.47 
2" $27.51 
July I, 1998 - June, 30 1999 2 112" $75.00 
3" $55.07 Summer 0.72 
4" $84.91 
3/4" & I" $7.06 
I 112" $20.10 Winter 0.5 1 
2" $29.96 
July I, 1999- June, 30 2000 2 112" $ 100.00 
3" $59.73 Summer 0.78 
4" $9 1.95 
3/4" & I" $7.55 
I 112" $2 1.51 Winter 0.55 
2" $32.06 
July I, 2000- June, 30 200 1 2 112" $ 100.00 
3" $63.9 1 Summer 0.83 
4" $98.39 
3/4" & I" $8.08 
I 112" $23.02 Winter 0.59 
2" $34 .03 
July I, 200 1 - June, 30 2002 2 112" $100.00 
3" $68.38 Sununer 0.89 
4" $105.28 
3/4" & I" $8.40 
I 112" $23.94 Winter 0.61 
2" $35.67 
July I, 2002 - June, 30 2003 2 112" $100.00 
3" $7 1.12 Summer 0.93 
4" $109.49 
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The state public infonnation campaign started on October 31, 2001. ln the 
regression analysis entries before this time are ass igned a 0 and after this time a I . This 
does not, however, exactly represent a true estimate of public infonnation campaign 
effectiveness. The Jordan Valley Water Conservancy District originally developed the 
"S low the Flow, Save H20" campaign years earlier at a regional level throughout the Salt 
Lake Valley. The state subsequently adopted this campaign based on its established 
name recognition. Still, the dummy variable used in this study can be justified on the 
presumption that once adopted at the state level, funding increased and it was better 
publicized. Its coefficient in the econometric models is interpreted as the effect on 
average water consumption once the campaign was adopted at the state level2 
Building area, number of bathrooms, and lot size were obtained from the county 
recorder's office by matching a parcel number for the dwelling also availab le to the water 
utility. The income variable is a proxy obtained following Nieswiadomy and Molina 's 
(1989) procedure, later used by Hewitt and Hanneman (1995). First, the taxable value of 
the dwelling was retri eved from the county recorder' s office. Using the fact that banks 
usually issue loans such that a monthly mortgage payment does not exceed one-third of a 
borrower's income, and assuming a ten percent interest rate, it is approximated: lncome = 
(Taxable Value)(0.10)(3/12). These va lues were then adjusted for inflation using the 
CPI, and trended using the average annual growth rate of per capita income in Salt Lake 
City for the years 1999-2002. 
2 The dummy variable approach to estimating the campaign is not ideal. It assumes that marketing strategy, 
funding, and overall intensity of the campaign are the same in each month. Perhaps using a proxy for 
intens ity, such as monthly expendin1re for the program, would better model changes in the campaign over 
time. 
w, 
MP 
D 
Variable 
I 
STF 
PRECIP 
WETF 
TEMP 
ET 
AREA 
BATH 
LOT 
METER 
APT 
RATE 
FEE 
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TABLE3 
VARIABLE DEFIN ITIONS 
Name Description 
Household-average thirty day HCF of water used by consumer i at timet 
water use 
City-wide average monthly 
water use 
Marginal Price 
Taylor-Nordin difference 
variable (rate premium) 
Income proxy 
"Slow the Flow" Public 
information campaign dummy 
Average daily precipitation 
Fraction of wet days 
Average maximum daily air 
temperature 
Evapotranspiration 
Building Area 
Number of Bathrooms 
Lot size 
Meter size 
Apartment dummy 
Rate dummy 
Fixed fee dummy 
Average water use for the entire c ity in every month, t, 
measured in HCF 
Measured in 2002 dollars per HCF of water 
Implicit tax on consumers in 2002 dollars 
Calculated monthly income in 2002 dollars 
~ 1 if the campaign in effect (2001-2002); 
~o otherwise (1999-2000) 
As measured (inches) from nearest weather station 
Number of wet days divided by the total number of 
days in billing cycle 
Derived from nearest weather station to the dwelling 
Average daily E.T. using Blaney-Criddle specification 
Total area, in square feet, of the dwelling 
Total number of bathrooms for the dwelling 
Acres of the lot size of the dwelling 
Size, in inches, of the connection size to the dwelling 
= 1 if dwelling is zoned as an aparnnent 
=0 otherwise 
= I if marginal rate in effect when water use was read 
= 0 otherwise 
= l if fixed fee in effect when water use was read 
=0 otherwise 
Three weather stations are used to compute climate variables: the Salt Lake 
Airport, Hogle Zoo, and Murray Golf Course. The dispersion of the stations fortunately 
offers a range of accurate climate measurements across the valley. The Salt Lake Airport 
is located on the west side of the valley at a relatively lower altitude than the others. The 
Murray Golf Course, on the other hand, is on the eastern side of the valley on the benches 
of the Wasatch Mountain Range. Differences in elevation are then implicit in climatic 
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measurement, especially precipitation. The Hogle Zoo, located in the middle of 
downtown Salt Lake City, provides additional moderation. 
Us ing Geographic Information System (GIS) software, dwellings are assigned to 
the nearest weather station, and daily average readings of precipitation and temperature 
are given to each household. Because readings are daily, each household 's climate 
variab les perfectly match the days during the billing cycle. Evapotranspiration is then 
measured using the Blaney-Criddle (1950) method, suitable for desert-like climates 
similar to the Salt Lake Valley. Variable definitions are provided in Table 3. 
The database originally included approximately 3.5 million monthly observations 
of consumer water use. Cross sections with missing values, incomplete panels, and non-
res idential water users were eliminated from the dataset. We follow Nieswiadomy and 
Molina (1989) and simply eliminate those few households consuming less than 500 cubic 
feet ofwater3• For reasons described below, the sample panel is then limited to summer 
observations, and therefore consists of I 04 7 households for a total of eighteen months. 
Summary stati stics for this sample are found in Table 4. 
3Recent work by Dandy, Nguyen, and Davies ( 1997) attempts to capture the effects of pricing wi th fixed 
fees by dividing the sample into entries consuming within the free allowance and those above. The authors 
then separate observations into two models for pooled estimates. However, price variables are eliminated 
from the model of those consuming less than the free allowance s ince all of those consumers face a zero 
margina l price and zero difference variable. Estimates were re latively stable between the two mode ls for 
the authors' other explanatory variables. Since this study focuses on the policy implications of pricing 
instruments, and to avoid panel data complications from singling out observations for households, we do 
not es timate parameters of the model for those few househo lds consuming within the free allowance. 
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TABLE 4 
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF VARIABLES D URING SUMMER MONTHS 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Water use 42.54 30.66 
Marginal Price 0.85 0.15 
Taylor-Nordin Difference 4.05 1.41 
Income Proxy 3200.45 1502.35 
Slow the Flow 0.33 0.47 
Precipitation 0.026 0.02 
Fraction of wet days 0.15 0.08 
Ave. Maximum. Temperature 85.7 6.35 
Evapotranspiration 5.58 1.04 
Building Area 2073.28 827.23 
Bathrooms 2.1 0.91 
Lot Size 0.18 0.1 
Meter Size 0.76 0.14 
Arartment 0.002 0.04 
IV. MODEL SELECTION 
Agthe et al. (1986) were the first to use a system of linear equations representing 
water supply and demand "derived from an indirect utility approach to investigate the 
behavior of consumers facing a nonlinear budget set." The authors constructed supply 
functions to compensate for the endogeneity of marginal price and the difference 
variable. These equations included variables that shift or otherwise change the rate 
structure. We follow this approach, but adapt the model to household specific data. This 
reduces the supply equations to sets of instrumental variables as explained below. First, 
arranging the data by stacking all time observations for each household we form the 
following equations from the even panel of sample data4 : 
'The average price specification was not used after preliminary statistics revealed that in Salt Lake City 
average price would be negatively correlated with water use a priori. As shown in Figure I increased 
water use implies smaller average price merely because of the rate structure. 
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[I] 
[2] 
[3] 
i = I, .. . ,N t=I, ... ,T 
(N = 1047) (T = 44) 
The unobservable household specific disturbance for each equation is represented 
by c, , discussed in more detail below. The idiosyncratic disturbance term for each 
equation is e,,, and is transformed to correct for a first-order autoregressive disturbance 
process, AR( 1). The predicted marginal price (MP,,) and difference ( D,,) variables for 
household i in time period t, are obtained by the reduced form supply equations [2] and 
[3]. The explanatory vari ab les in these two equations consist of a series of dummy or 
shift variab les taken from changes in the rate structure and monthly averages of 
municipality-wide water consumption. During the forty-four month period, the marginal 
pricing structure was changed a total of nine times, and thereforez:,IP contains eight 
dummy variables indicating when a particular rate stmcture was in effect . The flat 
allowance fee during the sample period changed five times; thus, since the difference 
variable is affected by both fl at fee changes and marginal pricing, z,~ contains a total of 
twelve dummy vari ables. In addition, city-wide average monthly water consumption is 
included in both equations to represent the quantity of water available, on average, to 
each consumer given the current rate structure. Assuming that a single household's 
ab ility to change average water consumption for the entire city is negligible, all right 
hand side variables in [2] and [3] are exogenous to the system. Therefore, the supply 
equations simply reduce to a set of instruments for the marginal price and difference 
variab le. In addition, the exogenous variab les X,, in the water use equation [I] are a 
matrix of climate, policy, and household variables. In short: 
=[ In I , ,STF, , In AREA, , In LOT, , APT, , In BATH, ,PRECIP,,, WETF,, , In TEMP,, ·J 
x il 
In ET,,, In METER, 
z:,tP = (Rate2, Rate3, Rate4, RateS, Rate6, Rate7,Rate8, Rate9, w, ) 
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z,? = (Rate2, Rate3, Rate4, RateS, Rate6, Rate? , RateS, Rate9, w, Fee2, Fee3, Fee4, FeeS) 
Refer aga in to Table 4 fo r variable definitions. The structural parameters for this model 
Pooled Ordinmy Least Squares 
We use pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) as a starting point because of its 
convenience in estimation. However, using pooled OLSon equation [I] requires some 
very restrictive assumptions. We must assume that household specific effects do not 
ex ist, and that each observation can be treated as strictly independent of all others. First, 
we assume the existence ofu,, = c, + e,,, a composite error term, where u is iid. 
Assuming zero covariance between c, and e,, , thi s allows us to write equation [I] as: 
ln w,, = alnMP,, +fJlnD,, +X,,y+ u,; [4] 
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Individual household effect s, c,, may be subsumed in the idiosyncratic error terrn 
u,;·, implying zero correlation between the variables on the right hand side of equation [I] 
and the household speci fi e effects (Wooldridge, 2002): 
E(c,"'l lnMP,, , lnD,,X,, )= 0 (5] 
Similarly, OLS assumes that marginal price and the difference variable, along with all 
other explanatory variables, are strictly exogenous: 
[6] 
Final ly, we impose a constant variance restriction on the error terrn: 
E(u ,; ) = a-,; (7] 
Now we define matrix A = ( In MP In D X) and parameter vector 
o = (a (J y) , where MP, D, and X are vector representations of lnMP,, InD,,,and 
X,, respectively. OLS estimates from the pooled data given byaoLs = (A' At' A'(ln w) 
will be unbiased and efficient under the prior assumptions. 
Pooled OLS with Instrumental Variables 
We now consider that under block rate pricing the marginal price,MP,,, and the 
Taylor-Nordin difference variable , D,,, may be endogenous. We thus relax the 
assumption [6] that all variables in A are strictly exogenous. Following Greene (2003, 
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pg. 78) an instrumental variable (IV) technique is used. We write the projection of In MP 
on the exogenous variables from [2) as: 
lnMP = Z "P(Z "P 'Z"Pr' Z "P '(lnMP) [8) 
and the projection of In Don the exogenous variables from [3) as: 
[9) 
We next define matrix B =(In MP In D X) and write the pooled IV estimates 
as~ ,v = (B'Bt' B'(ln w). 
Fixed Effects 
Pooled estimates of the data do not account for heterogeneity across households, 
which may be important in explaining consumer water use behavior. To account for 
these household specific effects, we now relax assumption [5) , and acknowledge that 
some variables for all equations may be correlated with c, . The dummy vari ab le c, is 
simply used to distinguish households, and represents unobservable household 
characteristics5. However, with a large cross section of households (in our case 1047) the 
dummy vari able approach to defining this heterogeneity quickly becomes impracti cal. 
Standard fixed effects models (also called "within" estimates) "remove" thi s household 
effect by transforming the panel data through first differencing or deviating individual 
5 Suc h characteristics in our model may include a household 's relative degree of exposure to the public 
information campaign, sense of community, desire to conserve water, desire for a healthy lawn, etc. 
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observations from household means. Since c, is time invariant, either method eliminates 
it and all other time invariant variab les from the water use equation. Est imates after this 
transfonnation are consistent after rel ax ing assumption [5). We follow the latter 
approach and in so doing redefine [ 1]-[3] as: 
[10] 
(I MP - I MP)= (z 'fP - z"P \_up+ ( MP - ---,;p ) n If fl I 11 II yr ell e, [II] 
[12] 
where In w, , In MP; , etc. represent the respective mean values for each individual i, with 
respect to time. To simplify notation, we define a new set of equations: 
[13] 
[14] 
[15] 
where In w, = (In w, -In w,), In MP,, = (In MP;, - In MP; ), etc., or deviations from 
household means. 
Similar to the instrumental vari able procedure defined earlier, we define 
proj ections from In D and In MP for the fixed effects model: 
[16] 
[17] 
Now define matrix F = ( In M P In D X) and so lve for the fi xed effects 
estimators~·· = (F'Ft' F'(ln w) . These results are unbiased and consistent under the 
assumption that at least some of the variables in Fare correlated with the household 
effects (Wooldridge 2002). 
Random Effects (Generalized Least Squares) 
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Random effects estimates have the benefit of providing estimates for all 
explanatory variables, including those dropped in the fixed effects model. However, it 
again requires the restrictive assumption that household heterogeneity is not expressed in 
the household specific dummy variable. The procedure involves using generalized least 
squares (GLS) on the data sample, with a variance-covariance matrix defined below. 
First, we re-impose restriction [5] that individual specific effects are uncorrelated with 
right hand side variables, where c; is again subsumed in the error term u;, . Following 
Wooldridge (2002, pg. 259), we relax assumption [7], but retain assumptions (5] and (6] , 
and adopt: 
E(u;, u;, )= O":, V t * s 
E(u;, 2 )= Var(u;,} = O"; + O"; = O",; 
where the within-group disturbances, !.1 , are defined as: 
[18] 
(19] 
(20] 
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[
cr: + cr: 
cr' 
!! = E(u ,u,') = ·~ 
cr; 
[21] 
and for the entire sample, the complete covariance matrix is: 
[22] V·[I 
0 ... 
iJ·I,® fl n . . . 
0 ... 
where I N is an N x N identity matrix. 
Generalized least squares (GLS) regression requires adjusting equation [4) using 
the variance structure presented in [21] and [22]. This is done by pre-multiplying both 
sides of the equation by n-112 . Thus, when transfonning all three equations we have: 
[23] 
[24) 
[25] 
or, by Hausman and Taylor (1981 ): 
(In w,, - (1 - B) In w,) = (tn MP,, - (1 - B) in MP, }x + (tn D,, - (1- B) In D, )p + 
(x,;- (1 - B) X,:' )r + k- (1 - B)~) [26) 
(tn D,, - (I - B)lnD, )= (x,~- (1 - B)X,7 ~ 0 + k- (1 - B)e,0 ) [28) 
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where: 
e 
Again for simpli city, we define these equations as: 
[29] 
[30] 
[31] 
where w = (In w,, - (1- B)ln w, ), MP = (In MP,,- (1 - B)lnMP, ), etc. 
[n order to make the transformation e must be solved, implying that both a-; and 
a-; must be estimated. Consistent estimates of a-; are taken from the fixed effects model 
previously estimated (Wooldridge 2002). To obtain a consistent estimate of a-; consider 
the "between effects" model: 
ln w, = lnMP,a + 1nDJ3 + X,wr + c,w +e,w [32] 
[33] 
[34] 
When using between effects strictly time variant variables (i.e. do not vary between cross 
sections) are dropped from the estimation. The "Slow the Flow" campaign dummy 
variable, STF, and the instrumental variab le average city-wide water use, W, , are dropped 
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because of their time dependent nature. We define G =( In M~, In D, ~ '), so that 
regression coefficients for the between model are obtained by ~·· = (G'G t' G'(ln w ,). 
From thi s a-;£ is obtained. Using the relationship, a-; = a-~£ - ~a-; , all the requisite 
infonnation to generate e is now present (Hausman and Taylor 1981). This 
transformation implies that random effects estimators are merely a weighted average of 
between and fixed effects (Hausman and Taylor 1981). 
After obtaining an estimate for B and transforming the data, random effects 
estimates are calculated. Again using the first stage projections, we define a matrix 
R =(In kiP In D X). The random effects estimates become, ~·· = (R'Rt' R'(ln w). 
Although we gain the estimated coeffi cients on time invariant variables, random effects 
will onl y be consistent if assumption [5] holds. 
V. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Initially, estimates were generated from the previous four models for the entire 
sample of water users over the whole time period. It was found from these estimates that 
the marginal price and difference variab le were indeed endogenous in water use equation 
[I t Surprisingly, marginal price coefficients for the models were positive. After further 
6 The theoretical linkage between marginal prices and the difference variable has already been discussed. 
To empirica lly test the assumption of endogeneity, a Hausman (1978) specification test was performed on 
the fixed e ffects modeL The test statistic has a chi-square distribution with degrees of freedo m equiva lent 
to the number of explanatory variables (in th is case eight). It is defined as 
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investi gation of the rate structure, thi s result is explained by the invariance of real 
marginal pricing in winter months, and steep increases in pricing during the summer. 
Average summer marginal rates, after adjusting for inflation, were $0.85 per HCF of 
water. During the winter the average rate was $0.58 per HCF, and that rate stayed 
relatively constant across years. Coinciding with rate increases was a dramatic change in 
water use, from an average of 14.3 HCF of water per household per month in the winter, 
to 42.54 HCF during the summer. Thus, positive marginal prices were hypothesized to 
be due to collinearity associated with a summer dummy variable. 
To test if intercept or slope coefficients changed during summer months, we used 
a dummy variable indicating summer months and an interaction variable between the 
summer dummy and marginal prices, following Kmenta (1997, pg.469). We found that 
there was a statistically significant positive change in intercept during summer months, 
and a statistically significant negative change in marginal price slope. This follows 
intuition, as the positive increase in intercept refl ects a general outward shift in water use 
during months when there is greater water use. The negative slope change reflects 
increased elasticity of water demand in summer months when water use is more 
di scretionary in Salt Lake City. lf we assume, as Danielson (1979), that winter demand 
represents strict ly "in-house" demand, then almost two-thirds of summer water use is for 
outdoor purposes. Since outdoor use is arguably more discretionary than indoor use, we 
where, 0 is the difference between estimates using the instrumental variables and those without them, so 
that : 0 = 5 ;; - & ~~s. The terms, V :/, V ~'fs are variance-covariance matrices from the related 
estimation technique. The null hypothesis is that regression parameters are equivalent under the two 
models. Under the null hypothesis OLS estimates are considered consistent and efficient, but inconsistent 
under the alternative. IV estimates are consistent under both the null and the alternative, but ineffici ent 
under the null (Nieswiadomy and Molina t 989). For our data, the resulting statistic is nt = 193. 1 which 
greatly exceeds the chi-square critical value of 20.09 at the one percent significance level. We thus 
conclude that the marginal price and difference variables are endogenous, and proceed with the two-stage 
estimation technique. 
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TABLE 5 
PANEL ESTIMATIONS OF INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES' 
Fixed Effects Random Effects 
lnMP In D lnMP In D 
w, 0.003 -0.009 0.003 -0.0 1 
( 136.43)** (-7 1.58)** ( 141.30)** (-70.62)** 
Rate2 0.302 0.304 
(477.05)** (527.61)** 
Rate3 -0.089 0.19 -0 089 0.171 
(- 134.37)** (64. 15)** (-14 1.58)** (58.27)** 
Rate4 0.322 0.099 0.324 -0.101 
(563.31 )** (39.41)** (596.47)** (-32.79)** 
RateS -0.041 0.219 -0.041 0.025 
(-60.84)** (47.23)** (-64.30)** (4.51)** 
Rate6 0.368 0.1 76 0.369 -0.197 
(659.56)** (55. 11)** (697.70)** (-40.71)** 
Rate7 0.334 -0.032 
(72.82) .. (-5.06)** 
RateS 0.41 0.25 1 0.411 -0.293 
(756.57)** (58.24)** (799.6 1)** (-41.70)** 
Fee2 0.095 -0.249 
(32.58)** (53.90)** 
Fee3 0.069 -0. 103 
(33.50)** (-40.81)** 
FeeS -0.09 1 0.08 1 
(-35.23)** (25.66)** 
Constant -0.582 1.287 -0.58 2.013 
(-717.33)** ( 179.90)** (-213.0 1)** (176.80)** 
R-Squared 0.99 0 .80 0.79 0.39 
Number of 17799 17799 18846 18846 
Observations 
t-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at I% level 
would expect summer months' price elastic ity to be greater (in absolute terms) than 
winter. 
Using the motivation that prices do not vary in winter months, we limit the dataset 
to include just those summer months for which average city-wide water use was above 25 
HCF (i.e. the months of June, July, August, and September) . First stage estimates of the 
7 When eliminating winter months the first and last marginal rate structures, Rate ! and Rate9, were not in 
effect for any sununer month in the sample, nor was fi xed Fee l. 
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instrumental variab le coefficients for the fi xed effects and random effects models are 
provided in Table 5, and estimates for water use are provided in Table 6. Estimation 
results indicate good model perfonnance. Vari ab le coefficients are relatively stab le 
across random and fixed effects models indicating robust estimates . 
The first stage regressions produce high goodness of lit measures, essential in order to 
achieve good instruments (Renwick and Green 2000). The R-Squared value for the fixed 
and random effects water use models are 0. 78 and 0.46, respectively, and are well within 
the range of previous studies. In both water use models all variables have the expected 
signs and are stati sti cally significant. A Hausman (1978) specification test provides 
strong evidence for using the estimates of the fixed effects model8 Intuitively, the key 
consideration in deciding whether a random or fi xed effects model is most appropriate 
depends on whether the explanatory variab les are uncorrelated with individual effects 
(Wooldridge 2002). Our conclusion impli es that unobservable effects due to fixed 
household specific heterogeneity are an important element in measuring water use. 
Evapotranspiration, the approximate rate at which water evaporates, is positively 
associated with water use. This presumably refl ects the high proportion of outdoor water 
use in summer months. Consistent estimates from the fixed effects model indicate that a 
I 0 percent increase in the rate of evapotranspiration would result in consumers using 3.6 
percent more water. Average maximum dai ly air temperature elasticity is stati stically 
8 This requires another Hausman specification test of a slightly different form: 
where 0 = & ~; -a:; ' and v ;;£' v /~£are the fixed effects and random effects covariance matrices. 
Fixed effects estimates are cons istent when household effects are correlated with the explanatory variables , 
but random effects are not. A statistically significant d ifference between the two estimates is considered 
evidence against the random effects model (Wooldridge 2002). The chi-squared test statistic with eight 
degrees of freedom is 5987.2 1 which exceeds the critical va lue of20.09 at a one percent significance level. 
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TABLE6 
PAN EL ESTIMATIONS OF WATER USE 
Fixed Effects Random Effects 
ln w lnw 
lnMP -0.407 -0.366 
(- 16.90)** ( -9.45)** 
lnD - l.l91 -0.732 
(- 11.69)** (-13.10)** 
ln I 0.411 0.426 
( 14.40)** (9.57)** 
STF -0.007 -0.053 
(-0.95) (-7.21)** 
lnET 0.357 0.3 19 
(6.7 1)** (9.12)** 
PRECIP -1.37 -1.241 
(- 11.28)** (-10. 17)** 
ln TEMP 0.233 1.255 
(3.22)** (25.42)** 
WETF -0.099 -0.19 1 
(-3.24)** (-6.36)** 
APT -0. 19 
(-0.72) 
In BATH 0.126 
(3.33)** 
ln AREA -0.054 
(-0.98) 
ln LOT 0.49 
(13.8 1)** 
In METER 0.264 
(338)** 
Constant -0.112 -3.638 
(-4.59)** (-8.84)** 
R-Squared 0.78 0.46 
Number of 
Observations 17799 18846 
t-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at I% level 
significant at 0.23, which also intuitively reflects the di scretionary use of outdoor water. 
The elasticity of precipitation, calculated at the mean, is -0.04. This implies that if 
monthly precipitation increases by I 0 percent, average household water use would 
decrease by 0.4 percent. The fraction of wet days during a month also mildly affects 
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consumption . Unfortunately, since random effects estimates are inconsistent, coefficien ts 
for variables representing time invariant household characteristics remain ambiguous9 
V. CONCLUSION 
From the preceding estimations we find that marginal price and the Taylor-Nordin 
difference variable are endogenous to the water use equation. Because unobservable 
household effects are correlated with the exogenous variables, fixed effects estimates 
using an IV procedure to correct for price endogeneity generates the appropriate 
estimators for this model. 
A number of important findings can be gleaned from these results. First, the 
hypothesis that the influence of the difference variable is equal in magnitude and opposite 
in sign of the income effect is rejected at a one percent level ofsignificance10 Other 
studies have had simi lar findings in thi s respect. Nieswiadomy and Molina (1989) 
explain the deviation from theory may be due to the surrogate nature of the income 
variable, the fact that the difference is such a small fraction of income, or because of 
consumers ' lack of information on complicated rate structures. 
Our estimation techniques provide unique insight to evaluate the effects of public 
information campaigns and other public policies on Salt Lake City households' water use 
patterns. The elasticity of marginal price is approximately -0.4 for both models, which is 
within the range of measurement from previous studies (Dalhuisen et al. 2003), especially 
9 Nauges and Thomas (2000) outline ga ins in efficiency and the potential to recover estimates of the time 
invariant variables for the fixed effects model by using instrumental variable techniques (see Hausman and 
Taylor, 198 1 and Amemiya and MaCurdy, 1986). Despite this, variables exogenous to c1 , needed for that 
estimation, were not avai lable. Climate variables largely depend on house location and are therefore 
specific to the household. 
1
° For the fixed effects model, the test statistic for the null hypothesis that 81 + fJ = 0 is 10.76, and is 
rejected on a 99 percent confidence interva l assuming a normal z distribution. 
when compared to previous research on water demand in the western Un ited States 
(Brookshire et al. 2002). 
Elasti city measures are limited by the assumed Jog-linear functional form of our 
model , and must be interpreted with caution. The assumption that price elasticity is 
constant in any price range is probably umealistic (Gaudin, Griffin, and Sickles 2001). 
This makes predictions outside of prices within the dataset umeliable (Brookshire et al. 
2002). Nevertheless, the estimates obtained may provide significant insight into the 
relative effectiveness of public policies on households ' behavior over the time being 
studied. However, econometric estimates of winter marginal price elasticity cannot be 
generated because there is virtually no price variation within our dataset during those 
months. 
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The public information campaign dummy coefficient is insignificant in the more 
appropriate fi xed effects model. Despite Nieswiadomy's (1992) finding that public 
information campaigns are extremely potent in the West, this does not appear to be the 
case in Salt Lake City. In comparison with other areas (see Table I), the "Slow the Flow" 
campaign has had negligible impact on water consumption. Costs of implementing the 
information campaign are beyond the scope of thi s paper, but any positive cost would 
indicate a failure of cost-benefit criterion given the zero effect evident in the econometric 
analysis of thi s study. 
One caution in interpreting the effect of the public information campaign needs to 
be noted, however. The measure of the influence of the campaign on water use is simply 
whether the campaign is in existence (the dummy variable thereby taking on a value of I) 
or not (the dumm y variable thereby being 0). We were unable to obtain data that would 
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indicate the intensity of the campaign, particularly as the campaign was implemented in 
the Salt Lake City area. It is still an open question as to whether the intensity of the 
implementation of such campaigns affects conservation behavior. We also only measure 
the existence of the campaign for certain time periods within the Salt Lake area. The 
effect of such campaigns may be quite different when implemented in other areas. 
Certainly more study of the effects of these types of strategies on water conservation is 
needed. 
The dominant results of this study, however, do indicate that price changes have 
been more effective at achieving water conservation than the public information 
campaign. Mean household consumption in Salt Lake City during summers before the 
campaign was 43.75 HCF of water per month and 40.12 HCF afterward, for a decrease in 
average consumption of8.3 percent. The average marginal price of water for summers 
before the campaign was $0.83, and after the campaign was $0.89, or an increase of 6.74 
percent. Based on a marginal price elasticity of -0.4, mean consumption decreased by 2. 7 
percent as a result of the increases in rate pricing. The negative coefficient of the 
difference variable implies that fixed fee changes have had an even more pronounced 
effect on water consumption. 
Recently, Salt Lake City implemented a more aggressive rate structure to take 
advantage of potential conservation from consumer reaction to price change. In June 
2003 the city changed the existing billing structure in three ways: (I) it extended summer 
pricing to the months of April, May, and October; (2) eliminated the 500 cubic foot 
allowance; and (3) instituted an increasing block rate (3 blocks) system of marginal 
pricing (SLC DPU 2004). Real marginal prices within the blocks are significantly higher 
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than in previous years. This policy change seems especiall y promising because hi storica l 
rates, even in summer months, have not increased substantially. These changes wi ll 
likely result in more residential conservation than simple reli ance on the statewide public 
information campaign. 
In 200 1, the Utah Department of Natural Resources, Division of Water Resources, 
formally publi shed a conservation goal of reducing municipal and industrial water use 
throughout the state by twenty-five percent before 2050 (UDWR 2003). To achieve that 
goal, reductions were to be reali zed through public information and the instillation of 
more water efficient technologies (UDWR 2003). This study suggests that in Salt Lake 
City, the state 's largest city, changes in price can be effective at achieving conservation, 
and may provide incentives for the adoption of more effi cient technology in water 
distribution and use. 
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